Lions or squeaking mice? by Keene, Lord Justice
Lions or squeaking mice?
The Fifth Annual Lecture to be presented to the Society for Advanced 
Legal Studies was given by Lord Justice Keene on 12 June 2002, who spoke 
on judges and judicial review at the start of the 21st century.
I n giving this annual lecture not only do I follow in dauntingly illustrious footsteps, but few practising judges would ever claim to be engaged in legal studies 
to a degree which could by any stretching of the English 
language be described as "advanced." In the higher courts, 
we are after all mostly drawn from the ranks of the Bar, 
whose approach to academic legal writings was memorably 
captured by John Mortimer in R v Rumpole:
'Rumpole applied a torn-off page of the Criminal Law Review 
to the electric fire, and lit his small cigar.'
Sir John Smith is probably not alone amongst academic 
lawyers in regarding the judiciary as belonging to the same 
camp as Rumpole.
The source of the first part of the title of this lecture 
was, of course, Francis Bacon, the then Lord Chancellor, 
who described the judges as 'Lions under the throne." 
The mice are of more recent origin. They derive from the 
reactions to the famous Second World War case of 
Liversidge v Anderson, which concerned the words "if the 
Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe' in 
regulation 18B, and in the course of which Lord Atkin 
delivered his powerful dissenting speech, where he spoke 
about having listened to arguments which might have been 
addressed acceptably to the Court of Kings Bench in the 
time of Charles I. The subjective interpretation adopted by 
the majority in the House of Lords   an interpretation of 
extreme deference to the executive   provoked a letter to 
Lord Atkin from Mr Justice Wintringham Stable. Written 
in characteristically trenchant terms from the judges' 
lodgings in Leicester, where he was then on circuit, the
o o ' '
letter expressed approval of Lord Atkin's dissent, and then 
added:
7 venture to think the decision of the House of Lords has 
reduced the stature of the judiciary, with consequences that 
the nation will one day bitterly regret. Bacon, I think, said 
the judges were the Lions under the throne, but the House of 
Lords has reduced us to mice squeaking under a chair in the 
Home Office.'
In fact, neither quotation can be taken entirely at its face 
value, and the contrast between the lions and the mice is 
more apparent than real. Lord Chancellor Bacon was a
firm supporter of the royal prerogative, and the emphasis 
in his words was as much on the judges being under the 
throne as on them being lions.
o
'The 12 judges of the realm being the 12 lions under 
Solomon's throne, they must be lions, but yet lions under the 
throne: they must show their stoutness in elevating and 
bearing up the throne.' (Essay of Judicature)
As for Stable J, his gloomy assessment has not been 
borne out by events. Liversidge v Anderson is now 
acknowledged to have been a wartime aberration, and fewo '
Home Secretaries in recent times seem to have regarded
o
the judiciary as quite as insignificant as Stable J feared. The 
charge often heard is not that the judges are too 
subservient to the executive but rather the opposite, 
namely that they have become too powerful while 
remaining unaccountable.
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
It was in fact some Ministerial expressions of concern 
along these lines, which prompted me to choose this topic.
I say at once that such statements of concern by Ministers 
about the scope of judicial review are not new and are not 
confined to those of any particular political persuasion. 
Rather they seem to be the instinctive reaction of a 
decision-maker when one of his decisions has been 
overturned in the courts. It was a former Home Secretary 
in a previous administration who said recently that judicial 
review
'started as a valuable exercise in limiting the arbitrary exercise 
of ministerial powers. Expanded over the years by activist 
judges, it has begun to substitute government by un-elected 
judges for government by elected ministers.' (Michael 
Howard, The Times, 1 December 2001)
The reaction of the Home Office last December to the 
decision of Sullivan J in the International Transport Roth 
GmbH v Secretary of State Jor the Home Department, The Times,
II December, 2001 case, to declare the fixed penalties on 
lorry drivers and haulage companies, whose vehicles 
contained illegal immigrants, incompatible with the 
European Convention on Human Rights, seems almost 
muted in comparison. The Home Office said that
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'The Home Secretary is concerned that, once again, the 
courts have intervened with an interpretation that has Jailed 
to take account of the reasons for the implementation of the 
policy. An immediate appeal would be launched.'
It was, and as we now know, it failed. The Court of 
Appeal held that the penalty regime established by the 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 exceeded what was 
necessary in the interests of achieving improved 
immigration control, in other words that it was 
disproportionate and in breach of the Convention.
Such Ministerial reactions to adverse decisions may be 
no more than expressions of the natural regret all of us feel 
when we are held to have gone wrong in a decision, and I
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include judges in that category. It is usually a short-lived 
sentiment. But, in case such comments reflected a more 
enduring and perhaps growing concern, it seemed to me 
to be useful to examine whether there is any basis for the 
anxiety. After all, it is true that judges are not accountable, 
in the sense of being subject to periodic election or to 
dismissal because they make an unpopular decision. The 
necessity for judicial independence is seen, in this country 
at least, as requiring not only independence from the 
executive but also freedom from popular pressure.
One does not foresee any significant change in that 
independence, which was achieved as a result of the Bill of 
Rights and the Act of Settlement and is now embodied in 
section 1 1 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Contrary to the 
images portrayed in some television dramas, no acolytes in 
dark glasses are sent out by the Lord Chancellor's 
Department to pressurise judges into deciding cases in a 
particular way. But if it is right that judges are not 
accountable as Ministers and other politicians are, have 
they become too powerful, too interventionist, especially 
in public law matters? In short, has judicial review grown 
too big for its boots?
o
It is right that, looking at the long-term picture, judicial 
review has certainly grown. There was a lengthy period, 
from at least the Second World War until the 1960's, when 
the courts were very reluctant to intervene in decisions by 
public bodies, unless they could be classified as judicial or 
quasi-judicial ones. The assumption seems to have been 
that public power was not open to serious abuse, and 
therefore intervention was not required. This period of 
judicial passivity ended with cases such as Ridge v Baldwin, 
Padfield v Minister of Agriculture and of course Anisminic, 
respectively 1964, 1968 and 1969. It was, incidentally, 
remarkably prescient of R F V Heuston in the 1964 edition 
of his Essays in Constitutional Law, p. 89 to refer to Ridge v 
Baldwin as
' a decision which may mark the revival in England of 
judicial control over administrative powers.'
It did indeed. But that was nearly 40 years ago, a time 
when there was no Crown Office list, far less an 
Administrative Court, no nominated judges and a very
slow and cumbersome procedure for obtaining one of the 
prerogative orders. In 1974, there were only 160 
applications for leave to seek judicial review. Until 1977, 
applications for such an order had to go through an oral 
hearing before (usually) a three judge Divisional Court 
and, if leave was granted, before a Divisional Court for the 
substantive hearing. Such a process undoubtedly deterred 
potential applicants for judicial review. It is therefore 
scarcely surprising that the number of judicial review cases 
has grown markedly since those days, and no-one, so far as 
I am aware, is advocating a return to that state of affairs. 
The theme in some quarters that judicial review has 
increased excessively is related to more recent times. Is 
that borne out by the facts?
INCREASE IN CASES
In numerical terms, there has been a gradual, steady 
increase in judicial review cases over the last few years. In 
1994 there were 3,208 applications for leave to bring 
judicial review. By 2001 diis had gone up to almost 4,800, 
an increase of 3 8 per cent spread over a seven-year period. 
But the figures need closer examination. Within that total, 
the number of applications in immigration and asylum 
cases went up from 935 in 1994 to 2,398 last year, an 
increase of 1463. The more mathematically minded will 
immediately appreciate that the increase in total 
applications was almost entirely accounted for by the 
additional immigration and asylum cases. Last year exactly 
half the applications for leave in judicial review (or 
permission, as it is now called) were in asylum or other 
immigration cases, and the great bulk of those are in fact 
asylum cases.
So asylum cases on one side, there is no evidence that 
judicial review is expanding in a quantitative sense. Asylum 
cases have grown for a variety of reasons, mainly the bitter 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, 
Northern Iraq and Sri Lanka. Those reasons do not 
include a more power-hungry judiciary.
Now, of course, that numerical approach is an 
extremely crude test of what is happening, redolent of 
the old rag-trade maxim 'Never mind the quality, feel the 
width.' The real issue is whether the courts are becoming 
more interventionist, more willing to quash decisions of
public bodies, including those of government ministers.r 7 o o
The basic approach in judicial review has, with one major 
exception to which I shall come, not changed 
significantly. The object of such review is to ensure that 
such public bodies act lawfully, rationally and fairly, as 
Lord Diplock emphasised in the GCHQ case back in 
1985, although he expressed it more elegantly than I have 
done. Can anyone say that those criteria should not be 
observed by public decision makers? At the same time, 
the courts recognise that such bodies, and especially 
government, have their own proper sphere for 
decision making on the merits, free from judicial 
interference.
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DEVELOPING PRINCIPLES
It is true that, over time, the principles of judicial review 
have developed and expanded as part of the common law. 
The myth that such principles were merely part of 
Parliament's presumed intention when it legislated has 
been exposed, Lord Woolf describing it as a 'fairy tale.' As 
a result, judicial review is now applicable not just to the 
exercise of statutory powers but also to that of 
non statutory powers, including some of the prerogative 
powers, as the GCHQ case itself made clear. I say 'some of 
the prerogative powers', because the courts accept that the 
prerogative is sometimes concerned with matters of high 
policy, such as the making of treaties, deployment of the 
armed forces or the allocation of domestic finance 
between one desirable objective and another. In such cases 
the courts acknowledge that they are not equipped to 
make decisions. In contrast, we had a case in the Divisional 
Court earlier this year where we decided that the courts 
could intervene over the exercise of the royal prerogative 
when used to reduce a prisoner's sentence in return for his 
help to the police or other authorities.
In addition, there has been the emergence of the 
concept of legitimate expectation, whereby the courts will 
enforce a clear representation or promise by a public 
authority as to how it will deal with a particular matter. As 
is well known, this concept first emerged in this country in 
cases involving an expectation of procedural steps being 
taken, such as an expectation of being consulted. But over 
the years the principle has come to be applied in cases of 
substantive expectation, that is to say where a substantive 
benefit had been promised.
One of the earlier instances of this was ex pane Unilever, 
a tax case where the Inland Revenue was prevented from 
changing its stance without warning to a taxpayer over the 
late submission of claims for loss relief. More recently 
substantive legitimate expectation has been approved in 
the Coughlan case, where the Court of Appeal held that a 
promise to a severely disabled patient by the local health 
authority that specially adapted accommodation would be 
her 'home for life' could not simply be abandoned by a 
decision to move her into a different kind of institution.
So there has been the inevitable slow, incremental 
growth of the principles of judicial review over time, 
somewhat expanding its scope. Yet even legitimate 
expectation has not broken entirely new ground. Even 
before it appeared, the courts were seeking to find a 
principled way of preventing public bodies from resiling 
from their promises to the citizen, without conflicting with 
their public duty. Initially the courts sought to do this by 
using the private law concept of estoppel in cases such as 
Wells v Minister of Housing and Local Government in 1967 and 
Lever Finance Ltd v Westminster City Council in 1971. It was 
never a happy importation into the public law field and, as 
Lord Hoffmann has recently emphasised in the R v East 
Sussex County Council, ex pane Reprotech Ltd [2002] UKHL 8
case, it has now effectively been replaced by the concept of 
legitimate expectation.
In addition, the courts had themselves been evolving a 
more sophisticated approach towards the standard to be 
applied in judicial review cases where fundamental rights 
were involved. As long ago as 1987 in ex pane Bugdaycay, the 
asylum case, Lord Bridge declared that within the normal 
limits of judicial review
'the court must, I think, be entitled to subject an 
administrative decision to the more rigorous examination, to 
ensure that it is in no wayjlawed, according to the gravity of 
the issue which the decision determines. The most 
fundamental of all human rights is the individual's right to 
life and when an administrative decision under challenge is 
said to be one which may put the applicant's life at risk, the 
basis of the decision must surely call for the most anxious 
scrutiny.'
The same emphasis on a variable standard, depending 
on the degree of intrusion into fundamental rights by the 
public body, was repeated in R v Secretary of State Jor the 
Home Department, ex pane Brind [1991] AC 696, and 
appears in ringing terms in the judgment of Sir Thomas 
Bingham, MR, in R v Ministry of Defence, ex pane Smith in 
1996. That was the case where there was a challenge to the 
government's then policy of prohibiting gays and lesbians 
from serving in the armed forces. The Master of the Rolls
o
said:
'the court may not interfere with the exercise of an 
administrative discretion on substantive grounds save where 
the court is satisfied that the decision is unreasonable in the 
sense that it is beyond the range oj responses open to a 
reasonable decision-maker. But in judging whether the 
decision-maker has exceeded this margin of appreciation, the 
human rights context is important. The more substantial the 
interference with human rights, the more the court will 
require by way of justification before it is satisfied that the 
decision is reasonable in the sense outlined above.'
That approach to the concept of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness is clearly a flexible one.
So the common law had not been static. There were 
these valuable, if relatively modest, developments in 
judicial review principles. Even in that context there were 
occasional dramas, where the courts came into conflict 
with central government over a matter regarded by the
o o J
latter as of importance. The Pergau Dam case, R v Secretary 
of State Jor Foreign Affairs, ex pane World Development Movement, 
provides a vivid example. Yet all that the court there was 
doing was construing an Act of Parliament, one of its 
normal functions, and doing so according to established 
principles. The defeat for the Secretary of State came 
about because the Government of the day had not been 
prepared to take the advice of its legal advisers before 
drafting and promoting the statute. That was an 
exceptional case, which in fact illustrates the general rule
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normally applicable: that is to say, there is normally a 
valuable creative tension between the executive and the 
courts.
As judicial review expanded in the 1960's and 1970's, 
government responded in a positive way by producing the 
booklet to assist civil servants in their work, 'The Judge 
over Your Shoulder'. But that booklet was a positive 
response, attempting to ensure that civil servants operated 
in ways which met the standards required by the courts.
IMPACT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
You will have noticed that I have been using the past 
tense, and for good reason. It brings me to the major 
exception I referred to earlier, something which has 
undoubtedly altered the relationship between the courts 
and the executive, and that is the Human Rights Act 1998. 
The incorporation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights into our domestic law has inevitably changed the 
approach of English courts towards public 
decision making, at least where those rights, or one ofCv o '
them, are engaged. It not merely empowers, it actually 
requires, the courts to adopt a more interventionist stance. 
Yet at the same time it remains for the courts to work out 
the extent of such intervention, and that may give rise to 
some difficulties over the next few years.
Three aspects of the Human Rights Act seem to me to be 
particularly relevant to the role of the courts in judicial 
review cases. First, there is the obligation imposed by 
section 3, the provision dealing with the interpretation of 
statutes. The court must interpret an Act of Parliament 'so 
far as it is possible to do so' in a way compatible with 
Convention rights. This of course applies to all cases where 
statutes and Convention rights are concerned; not just 
judicial review cases, but already such cases have involved 
considerable discussion of section 3. In order to construe 
a statutory provision so as to be compatible with 
convention rights, the court may have to "read down" the 
power (as Lord Steyn put it in R v A. (No. 2)), in other 
words giving to the statutory wording a meaning narrower
o o J o o
than its ordinary meaning. In essence, the court is 
restricting the apparent scope of the power. That 
happened most obviously in R v Lambert where the House 
of Lords construed section 28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971 as imposing only an evidential burden on a 
defendant, despite the wide language of the section.
Secondly, there is the court's obligation under section 4 
of the Human Rights Act to declare a provision of primary 
legislation incompatible with a Convention right where it 
cannot construe it compatibly, even using section 3. Here 
therefore we have the power, and the duty, to scrutinise 
Acts of Parliament against the criteria of Conventiono
rights, involving the courts in an exercise only previously 
engaged in where a conflict with European Community 
Law was alleged. It is a power which has already been used 
in a number of cases: the haulage case, Roth, already
referred to; the case about the discharge of mental health 
patients (R (on application of H) v Mental Health Review 
Tribunal, North and East London Region [2001] EWCA Civ. 
415; [2001] 3 WLR 5 12; and Matthews v Ministry of Defence, 
The Times, 30 January, 2002 where the court considered 
the provisions in the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 enabling 
the Secretary of State to certify that personal injury or 
death suffered by a member of the armed forces was 
attributable to his service and so preventing the Crown 
from being sued in tort. At first instance, it was concluded 
that those provisions were incompatible with Article 6 and 
the right of access to a court, but the Court of Appeal has 
recently reversed this.
Of course, the court's in declaration in such cases does 
not affect the legal validity or force of the statutory 
provision in question, as section 4(6) of the Human Rights 
Act makes clear. Consequently the court is not challenging 
the sovereignty of Parliament as lawmaker. The separation 
of powers remains intact. Nonetheless, as the decision in 
Roth and the reaction to it shows, that formal fig-leaf of 
section 4(6) may not offer very much protection for the 
courts where the statute embodies a policy initiative of 
government to which a minister is committed. The fact
o
that the courts merely "declare" incompatibility, rather 
than striking down the statutory provision, may not always 
suffice to turn away Ministerial wrath.
The third important feature of the Human Rights Act is 
the obligation imposed on the courts by section 2 to take 
account of the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence. Central 
to that jurisprudence is the principle of proportionality, 
\vhich now has to be applied by the English Courts in all 
cases, including those concerning public decisions, where 
there is a potential breach of a Convention right. This is 
not wholly new territory, since it has already operated 
where European law issues have been involved, but the 
area where proportionality is to be applied has been vastly 
extended since 2 October 2000.
What is quite clear is that proportionality requires the 
court to go further in its scrutiny of the decision under 
challenge than merely applying the test of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness, i.e. is the decision one within the range 
of decisions to which a reasonable decision-maker could 
have come. The House of Lords has spelt out the 
distinction in the crucially important case of Daly: R (Daly) 
v Secretary ofState for the Home Department [2001] 3 WLR 
1622. That was the case where the claimant successfully 
challenged the policy, which required all prisoners to be 
out of their cells while searches took place, including 
searches of legal correspondence. The House of Lords 
held that such an indiscriminate ban on prisoners being 
present could not be justified. It was an excessive and 
disproportionate interference with the prisoners' right of 
legal professional privilege. In the course of his speech, 
Lord Steyn, with whom the rest of the House agreed, 
endorsed the test of proportionality formulated in the
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Privy Council case of de Freitas, namely the three questions 
of whether:
'(i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify 
limiting a fundamental right;
(ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are 
rationally connected to it; and
(ni) the means used to impair the right orjreedom are no more 
than is necessary to accomplish the objective.'
Lord Steyn was at pains to emphasise that this does not 
mean that there has been a shift to a merits review. There 
is still an area of 'due deference', which the courts will 
allow to the decision-maker. Nonetheless, the third part of 
the test does involve the court applying its own judgment 
to whether the decision-maker has struck a proper balance 
between the right interfered with and the legitimate 
objective. That is a whole new ballgame. Traditionally the 
courts have in judicial review taken the position that the
weight to be attached to different factors relevant to theo
decision is a matter for the decision-maker, subject only to 
Wednesbury unreasonableness. That has been seen as 
inherent in a discretionary power to make decisions. In 
Convention rights cases, the courts will henceforth apply a 
more intensive scrutiny to the balance struck by the 
decision-maker than would have happened under the 
Wednesbury principles.
It is right to note that the degree of intensity applied by 
the courts when scrutinising a decision will normally allow
o J
some margin of appreciation to the decision-maker, and 
that that margin will vary, depending on the subject-matter 
and the rights involved. That has been well demonstrated
o
by the Court of Appeal's recent decision in Samaroo [2001] 
UK HRR 1150, a deportation case raising the issue of 
whether deportation of the claimant was a proportionate 
interference with the right of respect for family life under 
Article 8. Dyson LJ said the court had to decide whether a 
fair balance between the individual's rights and the
o
legitimate aim of the public body had been struck, 
recognising that the decision maker still has a discretionary 
area of judgment. In deciding on what degree of deference 
to that judgment was required, the court should have 
regard to the nature of the right, the extent to which the 
issue requires consideration of social, economic and 
political factors, the extent to which the court has a special 
expertise, as it does, for example, in criminal matters and 
whether the rights involved have a high degree of 
constitutional protection such as freedom of expression or 
access to the courts.
It was held that the Secretary of State should be allowed 
a significant degree of discretion in assessing the
o o o
proportionality of his decision to deport the claimant, 
bearing in mind amongst other things the court's lack of
o o o
expertise in judging how effective the policy of deporting 
those foreign nationals convicted of serious drug offences 
was in deterring such offences.
The decision has been criticised, but the approach 
adopted in Samaroo seems to me to be right. The court's 
ability to make a sensible judgment about the balance 
struck between the public objective being pursued and the 
means employed to pursue it will vary, depending on the 
subject matter. The degree of deference accorded to the 
decision-maker will therefore vary as well. There is an 
interesting parallel here with the House of Lords' decision 
in Alconbury [2001] UKHL 23, where the view was taken 
that, where major planning or highway decisions were 
being taken by the Secretary of State, one was in the realm 
of issues of wide public importance, where the 
accountability of the decision-maker to Parliament was a 
relevant factor.
Having said all that, proportionality does involve the 
courts in a relatively new exercise and one which may 
often require a closer scrutiny of public decisions than 
before. There is potential here for greater conflict between 
the courts and the executive. Certainly the Human Rights 
Act has widened the court's powers and their approach will 
be different. But certain points need to be borne in mind 
when it is suggested that the judiciary is becoming too 
powerful:
(1) What has happened is not the result of some exercise 
in self-aggrandisement by the courts, at the expense of 
the other elements in our constitution. It was 
Parliament which passed the Human Rights Act, which 
requires the courts to uphold Convention rights and to 
take account of the Strasbourg jurisprudence.
(2) There seems to be little evidence that the courts have 
allowed these additional powers to go to their heads. 
Cases since the Act came into force show rather that 
the courts still observe the principle that there is a 
proper sphere of influence reserved to the executive, 
which the courts will respect. Against cases like Daly 
and Roth, one can set Alconbury, Samaroo and Rehman 
[2001] UKHL 47. The last of those was the House of 
Lords' decision about the ability of the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission to differ from the 
Home Secretary on the question of whether a foreign 
national was a danger to national security. Even though 
SIAC includes a person with experience of national 
security matters, the Lords held that it could not differ 
from the Home Secretary on that issue except on 
Wednesbury unreasonableness grounds. So far, therefore, 
the picture seems to be one of considerable judicial 
self-restraint, and recognition of the legitimate rights 
of a democratically elected body to legislate and to 
govern. Parliament remains sovereign.
(3) The role of the courts in protecting the fundamental 
rights of individuals and minorities is not new. It is a 
classic task of the courts in a democracy to protect the 
rights of the individual citizen, sometimes against the
o ' o
majority. Parliamentary sovereignty alone does not 
ensure this, as Albert Dicey himself was eventually
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forced to recognise. When Dicey was asked why 
Parliament did not command all blue-eyed babies to be 
killed, an important part of his answer was that MP's 
were not usually men of outrageous ideas. However, he 
was an Ulsterman, and in 1913 it became clear that 
MP's were about to vote in favour of the Home Rule 
Bill. Not long afterwards, Dicey lost his faith in 
Parliamentary sovereignty and pledged himself to 
violent resistance by signing the Ulster Covenant. TheJ to to
fact is that a modern liberal democracy is not only 
about government according to the wishes of the
o o
majority. It is also based on certain fundamental human 
rights, which are not automatically protected by 
majority rule. As John Stuart Mill said nearly 150 years 
ago in his introduction to 'On Liberty', there is a risk 
of the tyranny of the majority:
'The people may desire to oppress a part oj their number and 
precautions are as much needed against this as against any 
other abuse of power. The limitation therefore of the power of 
government over individuals loses none of its importance when 
the holders of power are regularly accountable to the 
community.'
This country has long subscribed to that. That is why 
the United Kingdom played a major part in drafting the 
ECHR, so much so that there are those amongst the 
French judiciary who regard it as an Anglo-Saxon 
intrusion into the civil law. The role of the courts in 
protecting the rights of individuals and of minorities, 
whether they are asylum seekers, gypsies, prisoners, gays 
or lesbians or others, is as crucial as ever to our democratic 
health and it is a task from which we should not shy away. 
One only has to think of the problems of Northern 
Ireland, exacerbated by the disregard of minority rights 
over a long period of time, to appreciate that the 
institutions of democratic government can themselves be 
put in peril if such rights are not respected.
I would, however, add one note of caution. The line will 
not always be easy to draw between deciding that a public 
body's decision offends against the principle of 
proportionality and remaking the decision itself on its 
merits. It is a more delicate task than was involved in the 
Wednesbury unreasonableness test and inevitably some 
mistakes will be made. There are dangers in a more
o
interventionist approach. The more that Judges get
involved in difficult issues of public concern, the more
pressure there is likely to be for them to defend their
decisions. Not long ago one leading politician was floatingo o o r to
the idea that judges should, before being appointed, 
appear beiore a Parliamentary committee for confirmation 
of their appointment. (William Hague, speech to Centre 
for Policy Studies, 1998). That is a slippery slope, which 
would lead to the political views of Judges being 
considered before they were appointed and to a real threat 
to judicial independence.
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
But how can a more interventionist approach be 
reconciled with the independence of the judiciary and the 
lack of formal public accountability of the judges? It seems 
to me that the answer can only lie in sustaining and 
increasing public confidence in the judiciary, so that the 
public is prepared to see the courts upsetting decisions 
made by public bodies, even by government ministers. The 
courts will not always have public opinion on their side on 
a particular issue. That is inevitable when the court is 
protecting the rights of a perhaps unpopular minority. But 
it then becomes all the more important that the judiciary 
retains the trust and confidence of the public in general 
terms.
It may well be that we have some way to go to achieve 
that end. Research by Professor Hazel Genn suggests that 
the public regards judges as old, out-of-touch, and as not 
understanding the lives and values of ordinary people. 
When an ICM poll in 1994 asked the question: 'Which 
types of people do you trust?' only 27 per cent of 
respondents ticked 'judges' - as compared, for example to 
81 per cent for doctors, 49 per cent for teachers and so 
on. We did rate better than estate agents (6 per cent) and 
politicians (5 per cent), and at the bottom came car 
salesmen and journalists with 3 per cent a-piece! The 
reason why more did not trust judges was not that they 
regarded them as corrupt but once again that judges were 
regarded as being out of touch. That same message has
o to to
emerged from the British Crime Survey.
I do believe that there are some false public perceptions 
here. To many members of the public who obtain their 
information from television, judges spend their time either 
in court wearing long wigs and banging a gavel, or in 
palatial lodgings on circuit, accompanied everywhere by 
their own private detective. The reality, which is that for 
the most part we lead fairly ordinary lives, travelling on 
tubes and buses, going to the pub and the cinema, 
watching the World Cup and so on, seems difficult to getto r ' to
across.
But we ourselves could do more. I believe that more 
openness about our work and us is required. The public 
should know that judges are now extensively trained in 
how to handle a case, how to sentence, how to use modern 
technology, and how to respect the customs and values of 
minority groups in the community. The evidence is that 
those who have had first hand knowledge of judicial 
performance have a reasonably high opinion of judges. 
When jurors in over 3000 criminal cases were asked in 
1993 how well the judges had performed in such tasks as 
keeping a fair balance between the defence and the 
prosecution and explaining things to the jury, over 99 per 
cent thought that the judge had performed either 'very 
well' or 'fairly well'. The lesson is that we are not 
successful in getting the message across to the public at
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large. As Lord Taylor said in 1992, the judges have 
themselves in part been responsible for the public 
misconceptions through our self-imposed isolation.
Some valuable steps are already being taken to improve 
things and to get the message across. The Lord 
Chancellor's Department and the Citizenship Foundation 
have recently produced an excellent booklet for teachers 
and schoolchildren, encouraging school visits to courts. 
But the Judges themselves need to be more willing too o
discuss their work, obviously in somewhat general terms, 
so as to promote greater public understanding. We need a 
judicial website, not just a Court Service website, and of 
course we need a more representative judiciarv containing 
a greater proportion of women and those from minority 
ethnic groups. It is only if we achieve greater public 
awareness of what we do and how we do it that we will 
overcome the misconception that we are out of touch with 
the world at large. And it is only by doing that that we are 
likely to achieve the long-term public confidence that is 
required if the courts are to be able successfully to perform 
their changing role in the field of judicial review.
My conclusion is that, while the Human Rights Act has 
brought about a shift in the relationship between the 
courts and the executive, the courts are still going to be
' o o
performing their classic task of protecting individual 
rights, while respecting the traditional territory occupied 
by Parliament and government. So far, the judges areJ o 'Jo
exercising their powers with caution, and I expect that to 
continue. It is, of course, the law which is supreme in this 
country, not the judges. If Parliament wishes to change theJ> ) o o
law, it can do so, and the courts will loyally apply that law. 
There need be no fear that the judges are taking over.
It was Tacitus who said in his Annals: 'Judges are best at
 J o
the beginning and deteriorate towards the end.' I may 
already have passed the critical point, but in the hope of 
avoiding further deterioration, I shall stop there. W
Boilerplate: 
Practical Clauses
New 3rd Edition 
Richard Christou
The brand new edition of this popular 
desk-top drafting companion now 
includes all the clauses in a handy 
accompanying CD-ROM format.The 
single source of the most commonly 
used boilerplate clauses, Christou gives 
detailed analytical commentary on each clause 
and provides advice on their practical application.
The book has been revised to take into account all relevant 
recent legal developments, particularly under the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 and in the area of consumer 
protection.This edition also focuses on new EC Directives and 
Regulations and examines the impact of electronic signatures 
on commercial transactions, disputes and conflict of laws.
£75
Book + 3"5 disk
0 421 78280 3 
Publishing August 2002
Also by Richard Christou,..
Drafting Commercial Agreements
2nd Edition
In one convenient volume, Drafting Commercial 
Agreements gives practical guidance (with precedents) for 
drafting and negotiating every type of business agreement 
likely to be encountered by commercial lawyers.
£125
Hardback
0 421 65410 4
Also available on disk
International Agency, Distribution 
and Licensing Agreements
3* Edition
Providing expertly drafted precedents supported by clause- 
by-clause commentary this book offers practical advice on 
the negotiation and drafting of international agency, 
distribution and manufacturing agreements.
£110
Hardback
0 75200 21 I 2
Also available on disk
* Sweet & Maxwell
A THOMSON COMPANY
Place your order today by calling 020-7449-1 I I I or visit www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/commercial
Amicus Curiae Issue 42 July/August 2002
